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Internet Freedom is rapidly becoming understood as a normative framework for how 
the Internet should function and be used globally. Recently declared a human right by 
the United Nations, it also forms a central pillar of the US 21st Century Statecraft 
foreign policy doctrine. This article argues that although there is a clear human rights 
agenda present in this policy, there is also a power element which is much less 
discussed or acknowledged in the vast literature on Internet Freedom. Through an 
exploration of both a short history and some important lessons learned about Internet 
Freedom, this article demonstrates how the US Department of State has adapted to the 
information age in such a way as to harness individual agency (reconceptualised in 
policy terms as ‘civilian power’) for the promotion of state power. Although this is by 
no means as stable or reliable as some more conventional mechanisms, it is an 
expression of power that meets with few challenges to its legitimacy.  
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Introduction 
Internet Freedom is rapidly becoming understood as a normative framework for how the 
Internet should function and be used globally. In June 2012, it was declared a human 
right by the United Nations Human Rights Council. The Resolution on the Promotion, 
Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet (UNHRC 2012) calls on all 
states to promote and facilitate access to the Internet and to ensure that the same rights 
of freedom of expression that are available offline are protected and upheld online. 
There has been a strong global civil society movement to promote Internet Freedom—a 
norm that has been deeply embedded in the ‗culture‘ of Internet technology from the 
1980s. Organisations like the Open Net Initiative and the Electronic Frontier 
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Foundation work to identify and report on Internet censorship, filtering and 
surveillance. In addition to being regarded as an important principle and now a human 
right, Internet Freedom has been a central pillar of the US 21st Century Statecraft 
foreign policy doctrine, developed by former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. 
Through an analysis of Internet Freedom in US foreign policy, this article argues that 
Internet Freedom can be understood not only as the promotion of human rights or of a 
normative ‗public good‘ but also as an expression of state power. 
There is some political tension around Internet Freedom because it can conflict 
with the requirements of cyber-security (as has become clear in the wake of the Prism 
controversy in the US). The right to online privacy, and to view, write or interact free of 
surveillance is a deeply held and fiercely protected norm in many states. However, 
anonymity and the consequent difficulty in attribution of illegal online activity are 
deeply problematic from a cyber-security perspective—even in these same states. The 
same qualities of the Internet that afford anonymity to anti-social actors engaging in 
theft, espionage or disruptive behaviour also provide cover for political activists in non-
democratic states who wish to voice their ideas and collaborate with other like-minded 
citizens. The difficulty of online attribution is both a problem for state security and a 
safeguard for global civil society. Not surprisingly, balancing these imperatives of 
privacy and security is difficult and approaches to finding this balance vary widely. This 
is complicated further by the fact that although challenges to cyber-security are valid, 
some states that object to Internet Freedom arguably use cyber-security as a mask for 
deeper concerns about regime stability in the face of anonymity and freedom of political 
speech online (Deibert et al. 2011).  
The growing literature on Internet Freedom has focused almost exclusively on 
those states that overtly censor information, monitor online activities of individuals 
and/or limit access to certain sites in contravention of the principle of Internet Freedom. 
Less examined have been the ways in which policymakers in liberal democracies 
approach Internet Freedom where it resonates with ideas about individual agency, 
privacy, transparency, and freedom of information - all of which are intimately linked to 
government legitimacy. In states where these liberal ideas are deeply embedded, 
accommodating the changes that Internet technology has introduced in terms of state 
control over information has clearly been less of an adjustment than in states where civil 
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society has not yet established the same expectations of transparency and freedom of 
access to information. In effect, in liberal democracies the challenges of adapting to the 
information age were eased by pre-existing expectations of offline rights. However, 
even for these states the adaptation has not been seamless and governments have had to 
confront and adjust to change through developing new policy, law and practices—many 
of which are now being guided by the principles of Internet Freedom.  
Acknowledging and discussing the power component of Internet Freedom is 
important for a number of reasons. First, a particular set of norms is being built into the 
institutions, processes and principles that, to a significant extent, determine the way the 
Internet functions, is governed and develops. In this context, the promotion of Internet 
Freedom has not only become a dimension of US foreign policy, but also an expression 
of US structural and institutional power. In much the same way as the Bretton Woods 
agreement set in place the structure of the global economic system after the Second 
World War, so too are decisions and arrangements about the Internet laying down the 
pathways for how actors may legitimately engage with Internet technology in the future. 
This is neither good nor bad, but it is worthy of close analysis. All states may be 
expected to promote an online ecosystem that reflects their interests, principles and 
values and Internet Freedom is emerging as an important element in this practice for the 
US.  
Another important reason to acknowledge the power component of Internet 
Freedom is because it can enhance our understanding of why some states resist the 
adoption of the human rights element of Internet Freedom. Just as the Iraq war has 
undermined the legitimacy of the ‗Responsibility to Protect‘ initiative by blending 
human rights and national interest, the power component of Internet Freedom may be 
overshadowing the human rights agenda for some states. Finally, and related to the 
previous point, by understanding the way the US has conceived of this form of power, 
reluctant states may be influenced to reconsider the benefits of adopting Internet 
Freedom in some form. Although motivated by these observations, this article does not 
build an argument around these factors. Its more modest aim is to lay the conceptual 
groundwork for further investigation into them by establishing that there is a component 
of power in US conceptions of Internet Freedom.  
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This article proceeds in three parts. The first section briefly details the 
development of Internet Freedom as a human right in the US by tracing its political 
history as a civil right. This section demonstrates a clear link between Internet Freedom, 
human rights and liberal ideas about individual rights in order to clearly establish the 
authenticity of the human rights agenda in Internet Freedom. In the following two 
sections, the article explores two key sites that both demonstrate and further shape US 
approaches to Internet Freedom and power. The first of these two examples provides an 
analysis of the US Department of Defense‘s (DoD) response to military blogging 
(miliblogs) in the mid-2000s. This case predates notions of an explicit link between 
power and Internet Freedom as a foreign policy, and can therefore help to explain its 
evolution. As a policy approach, Internet Freedom has important antecedents that 
impacted significantly on US approaches to the control of information during war and 
political conflict. An analysis of policy shifts around military blogging is an effective 
way to demonstrate this empirically.  
In the second of these examples (and the third main section of the article), 
Internet Freedom as an element of power within the doctrine of 21st Century Statecraft 
is explored through the concept of ‗civilian power‘—arguably an outcome of the 
learning experience of dealing with military blogging in the US. Through an analysis of 
US foreign policy during the ‗Arab Spring‘—a major ‗laboratory‘ for examining the 
doctrine of 21st Century Statecraft – and theoretical concepts drawn from the 
philosophy of technology, this section provides insight into how US policymakers 
approach Internet technology in the context of ideas about the expression of US power.  
The article concludes by reaffirming that it would be inaccurate to suggest that 
Internet Freedom is without ideological support in the US, but that it has also been 
incorporated into a new approach to power in the information age. This element of 
power may go some way to explaining why some states may regard the foreign policy 
of Internet Freedom as the establishment of a new US led hegemonic framework for 
how the Internet should operate, be governed and develop in the future. 
 
Internet Freedom as a human right 
As explained earlier the argument in this article is not that Internet Freedom is simply 
power disguised as ideology; rather, it represents a confluence of both. Extensive 
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analysis of two decades of transcripts of Congressional hearings into cyber security 
reveals that even in the face of considerable concern about security vulnerabilities, US 
politicians tended to privilege privacy and freedom of information (Carr 2011). 
However, when they do so, they frequently make reference to US power as emerging 
from these values and principles. That is, they regard US power as contingent upon the 
political will to adhere to the kind of ‗moral framework‘ which they feel makes that 
state exceptional. The following section very briefly traces the emergence of Internet 
Freedom as a human right in the US over the past two decades while acknowledging 
that the antecedents of norms about freedom of information, privacy and individual 
rights go back well beyond Internet technology. 
In the early years of the Internet, the Bill Clinton–Al Gore administration 
focused predominantly on the domestic promise of a fully developed and implemented 
information infrastructure. Protecting civil rights was already regarded as critical even 
as awareness of security problems grew (Gore 1993, 1994). A 1995 General Accounting 
Office report identified several services which it argued would be essential for network 
security in the future. They included: ‗identification and authentication—the ability to 
verify a user‘s identity and a message‘s authenticity‘, and ‗nonrepudiation—the ability 
to prevent senders from denying they have sent messages and receivers from denying 
they have received messages‘ (Willemssen 1995: 20). These policies, if implemented, 
might have profoundly reshaped cyber-security technology, but in the US, they could 
not be reconciled with the values and principles associated with civil liberties and were 
never passed.  
Internet technology increasingly came to be seen as synergistic with a foreign 
policy based on liberalisation of trade, democratic enlargement and the promotion of 
human rights. By 1999, the concept of promoting human rights abroad and the 
relevance of the Internet in that pursuit united in the National Security Strategy which 
listed information and communications technology as key to mitigating human rights 
abuses and promoting the free flow of information (Clinton 1999: 26). In 2000, the US 
government produced the first national plan for the protection of the information 
infrastructure, Defending America’s Cyberspace. In it, the emphasis on the ideas behind 
Internet Freedom as a civil liberty continued to evolve and act as a counter-weight to 
security concerns (Clinton 2000: v). This duality of security and privacy is 
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acknowledged throughout the document, but ultimately it argues that ‗while 
safeguarding our critical infrastructures is vital, protecting our civil liberties is 
paramount‘ (Clinton 2000: xxxvi). 
During George W. Bush‘s presidency, the concept that access to the Internet was 
a human right which should be promoted globally continued to develop. A number of 
Bills were introduced (although not passed) designed to combat state sponsored 
censorship and monitoring of Internet use. The Global Internet Freedom Bill expressed 
the view that the United States should ‗denounce governments that restrict, censor, ban, 
and block access to information on the Internet‘ and ‗deploy technologies aimed at 
defeating state-directed Internet censorship and the persecution of those who use the 
Internet‘. [1] US government efforts to defeat the blocking of Internet access included 
funding to provide counter-censorship software to Internet users in places like China 
(Lum 2006). This, it was argued, would enable citizens of these states to ‗exercise their 
most basic rights‘ by using the Internet to communicate with each other and with the 
outside world (Kellerhals 2010). 
In January 2010 during a speech at the Newseum in Washington, Hillary Clinton 
identified Internet Freedom as a central pillar of her 21st Century Statecraft doctrine. 
Referring to information networks as ‗a new nervous system for our planet‘, she 
outlined the ways in which access could make societies stronger, hold governments 
accountable and help to promote the struggle for ‗freedom and progress‘ (Clinton 2010). 
The 21st Century Statecraft doctrine links the Internet to human rights in two ways. 
First, it perpetuates the approach developed over the previous decade that access to the 
Internet should be regarded as a civil and human right. In this context, Clinton 
repeatedly linked the Internet to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Clinton 
then expanded this to define the Internet as a new ‗site‘ of human rights abuses which is 
derived from what she dubbed the ‗freedom to connect‘—like the freedom of assembly, 
only in cyber-space: ‗I talked about how we must find ways to make human rights a 
reality. Today, we find an urgent need to protect these freedoms on the digital frontiers 
of the 21st century‘ (Clinton 2010).  
Clinton exhibited a sophisticated approach to the inter-relationship between 
competing expectations of privacy and security in Internet technology. Rather than 
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ignore or play down these contradictions, she acknowledged and confronted them. In 
her second major speech about Internet Freedom, Clinton argued that 
liberty and security, transparency and confidentiality, freedom of 
expression and tolerance—these all make up the foundation of a free, 
open, and secure society as well as a free, open, and secure Internet where 
universal human rights are respected, and which provides a space for 
greater progress and prosperity over the long run (Clinton 2011c).  
Her approach to finding a balance between these sometimes competing demands has 
been to limit the ‗universality‘ of this particular human right. After outlining the many 
advantages which Internet technology offers to the projection of US foreign policy in 
the Newseum speech, Clinton also remarked that ‗these technologies are not an 
unmitigated blessing‘ because the same technologies which promote human rights also 
allow groups like al-Qaeda to operate globally (Clinton 2010).  
In fact then, Internet Freedom as US foreign policy is a view which maintains 
that this human right is not as universal as some. While we might regard everyone, even 
al-Qaeda operatives, to be entitled to ‗basic‘ human rights like food, shelter and medical 
treatment regardless of the crimes they may commit, their right to Internet Freedom is 
contingent—in fact, it is deeply political. E. H. Carr (1964: 11) argued that utopia and 
realism were the two essential elements of political discourse—that one without the 
other was inadequate. This is perhaps what we see in Clinton‘s Internet Freedom 
speech—an aspiration to promote liberal norms and values that are understood to be the 
foundations of a freer and more equitable world, coupled with the acknowledgement of 
the reality that some limits on this right can best promote and protect US interests. In 
establishing a clear link between Internet Freedom as a ‗non-basic‘ human right and as 
related to US power, she also argues that ‗[t]hose who disrupt the free flow of 
information in our society or any other pose a threat to our economy, our government, 
and our civil society‘ (Clinton 2010). Ultimately, Clinton observes that the US will have 
to struggle to balance ideational and material power concerns in this context.
 
 
The power component of Internet Freedom is further examined later in this 
article. First though, it is useful to look at an empirical example that pre-dated Clinton‘s 
Internet Freedom policy. In the mid-2000s, military blogging brought the notion of 
access to the Internet as a civil right into conflict with imperatives of state security. An 
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analysis of how US policymakers responded to this allows us to consider what impact 
this learning experience had on future approaches to Internet Freedom, human rights 
and power. 
 
Internet Freedom in transition: Miliblogs 
Internet Freedom is particularly interesting to analyse during times of war and political 
conflict because this can be a time when governments, even in liberal democracies, are 
tempted to exercise greater control as part of a broader strategy of managing a crisis. It 
is a time when cracks can appear in an otherwise cohesive policy approach to these 
issues. In states with a less than free media, governments have more flexibility to 
control the flow of information and public communication. Liberal democracies that 
have a (relatively) healthy, functioning media face a different set of challenges. This has 
been explored comprehensively through the literature following the Vietnam War and 
further developed in a second wave of analysis looking at the revised US strategies of 
embedding journalists in the first and second Iraq wars (Aday et al, 2005; Hieber 2003; 
Pfau 2004). For many, these new approaches were regarded as an effort to maximise 
control over information about the conflict while simultaneously giving the impression 
of transparency. Much of the literature around these practices and approaches is based 
on the understanding that freedom of information and governmental transparency are 
linked to legitimacy in liberal democracies (Bell 2008; Dodson 2010; Paul and Kim 
2004).
 
 
In the 2000s, the US Department of Defense (DoD) faced a new challenge when 
soldiers serving on the frontlines in Iraq and Afghanistan began communicating to 
family, friends and strangers through blogs. Coined ‗miliblogs‘, these are typically 
unedited, uncensored and deeply personal blogs written by soldiers to express views 
that can differ quite significantly from broader institutional perspectives of either the 
Department of State, the DoD or the conventional media.  
In 2003, US infantryman Colby Buzzell began anonymously blogging about his 
experiences in Iraq. Buzzell‘s blog was funny and irreverent, but it also dealt candidly 
with both his fear and boredom, and his general bewilderment at why he and his 
colleagues were fighting in a desert across the globe from his home state. [2] His frank 
and articulate account was quickly picked up by the online community generating 
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hundreds of response emails a day (Cammaerts and Carpentier 2009). Buzzell‘s blog 
offered a fresh account of a war largely reported by embedded journalists existing on a 
drip feed of information and images controlled by the military. 
Military policy on social networking media at the time that Buzzell was 
blogging was unequivocal. Miliblogs were regarded as a security threat and an 
unauthorised release of information and images  (Sipress and Diaz 2007). In 2005, a 
series of DoD memos were issued to coincide with military orders to restrict access to 
sites including Facebook, YouTube and MySpace. General Richard Cody wrote that:  
The enemy is actively searching the unclassified networks for information, 
especially sensitive photos, in order to obtain targeting data and weapons system 
vulnerabilities for use against the coalition. A more aggressive attitude toward 
protecting friendly information is vital to mission success (Cody 2005).  
Some soldiers continued to blog, but a number received an ‗Article 15‘ non-judicial 
punishment and/or fines or demotions for posting material deemed sensitive. (Ambrosio 
2005). 
In 2007, following a significant and negative civil society response to the social 
media ban, the US military underwent a policy ‗about face‘ with the use of miliblogs 
not only allowed but actively encouraged, and indeed incorporated into staff training 
curriculums.  (Whitelaw 2009). General David Petraeus wrote to thank ‗the bloggers 
who have worked to provide accurate descriptions of the situation on the ground here in 
Iraq and elsewhere‘ (cited in Shachtman 2007). In response to questions about the 
reversal in policy towards miliblogs, Army Public Affairs Spc. Lindy Kyzer explained 
that ‗We‘re actually entering an era of transparency, where we need to have our soldiers 
talk … They are our best spokespersons‘ (Griggs 2009). 
While it is possible that improving transparency was a motivating factor, even in 
liberal democracies the military is not a context in which transparency is expected to 
trump either national security or the security of soldiers‘ lives. Lt. Gen. William 
Caldwell perhaps made a more salient point when he said that ‗[a]cross America, there 
is a widely held perception that media coverage of the War in Iraq is overwhelmingly 
negative‘ and to counter this: 
we must encourage our Soldiers to interact with the media, to get onto blogs 
and to send their YouTube videos to their friends and family. When our 
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Soldiers tell/share their stories, it has an overwhelmingly positive effect 
(Caldwell 2008). 
Petraeus endorsed this view. Milibloggers, he argued, had become increasingly 
important in the context of a shift from conventional news outlets to online news 
sources. ‗Your efforts strengthen the bonds of the military community‘ (cited in 
Shachtman 2007). 
In fact, this case reveals a ‗learning experience‘ in the US about options for 
liberal democracies to better synergise security and individual human rights—not 
through the control of information which quickly elicited significant approbation from 
the US public, but by recognising that individual agency that is broadly in harmony with 
US foreign policy interests can be a powerful propellant. Miliblogs certainly contain 
plenty of negative messages—about fear, loneliness, frustration and the tedium of 
war— but it had become clear that the connections forged between blogging soldiers 
and the US population had a positive effect on domestic support for the war. (Matheson 
and Allan 2007). Although it continues to have a somewhat troubled and conflicted 
relationship with social networking media (Corrin 2012; Dao 2009), the DoD found that 
the negative views expressed by some soldiers were offset by the fact that miliblogs 
significantly strengthened public identification with soldiers, and thereby reinforced 
domestic support for the war. This was an unintended but highly valued consequence.   
The concepts and ideas behind Internet Freedom as a foreign policy — that 
harnessing individual agency in order to promote US interests could be an effective 
alternative to the direct control exercised by less liberal states—resonates with this 
learning experience of the DoD during the early years of social networking media. The 
DoD initially regarded agency as the same as power in this setting. The initial restrictive 
policy response indicated an assumption that individual soldiers with the agency to 
disseminate information about the war zone detracted power from the DoD. In fact, they 
found that harnessing individual agency in the form of miliblogs not only enhanced 
DoD legitimacy (as it was seen to be progressive, transparent and open), but could serve 
to promote the agenda of the DoD through generating domestic support for the war 
effort. This approach to controlling information—or rather, in recognising the multiple 
benefits of not controlling it—for the promotion of US power was later united with the 
previously discussed and deeply held notions of Internet Freedom as a civil/human 
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right. Together, they were united in the concept of ‗civilian power‘ in the 21st Century 
Statecraft doctrine. 
 
Internet Freedom as US power 
Secretary of State Clinton‘s doctrine of 21st Century Statecraft articulates a view 
of US power which is closely integrated with information and communications 
technology. The emphasis of 21st Century Statecraft is on ‗people to people‘ diplomacy 
in recognition of the view that diplomatic outcomes are not defined solely by what elites 
prefer, but also by what the general population strives for. A key element of this 
approach is the understanding that civil society can become a catalyst for change in any 
state and this is linked to the projection of US power. As articulated in the Quadrennial 
Diplomacy and Development Review ‗fact sheet‘: ‗to advance American interests and 
values and to lead other nations in solving shared problems‘, the US must rely not only 
on diplomats but also on ‗civilian experts as the first face of American power‘ (US 
Department of State and USAID, no date). This is referred to by the Department of 
State as ‗civilian power‘, and it forms the bedrock of 21st Century Statecraft.  
‗Civilian power‘ can be conceptually linked to Joseph Nye‘s work on ‗soft 
power‘ and ‗smart power‘ (Nye 2004; Nye and Armitage 2007). It would appear (to 
some degree at least) to be an approach that decouples agency from power, or at least 
regards agential power as ‗non-zero sum‘. That is, agency previously concentrated in 
state instruments may expand to include civil society, but contrary to many current 
conceptions, power does not necessarily follow in a direct and related equation. The 
diffusion of agency does not necessarily and unequivocally lead to a diffusion of 
power—thereby weakening the traditional centre of power in the state. Soldiers may be 
awarded the agency to communicate their own individual view of the war to a global 
audience, but power was not necessarily transferred away from the state in this 
transaction. 
Less than a year after Clinton outlined her vision for 21st Century Statecraft and 
Internet Freedom, events in the Middle East provided an ideal opportunity to observe 
these ideas in the context of political conflict through the ‗Arab Spring‘ uprisings. 
Unlike the case of miliblogs, controlling and countering negative messages was not the 
primary challenge for the US here. The flow of information across social networking 
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sites was overwhelmingly supportive of the protestors—and largely in line with US 
foreign policy objectives. The literature around the use of social networking technology 
during the Arab Spring uprisings is extensive and predominantly revolves around the 
debate about whether social networking media had a significant role to play in the 
regime changes that followed or not (Gladwell 2010; Goodin 2011; Morozov 2011; 
Mourtada and Salem 2011; Shane 2011; Ward 2011; ). Rather than re-engage with this 
debate, the following section provides analysis of the ways in which Secretary Clinton 
and her senior policy advisors approached and interpreted this debate.  
The ‗philosophy of technology‘ provides a set of concepts useful for analysing 
political approaches to technology. Two are particularly evident in the broader debates 
around Internet Freedom during the Arab Spring; a determinist approach to technology 
and a social constructivist approach to technology. These approaches have different 
policy implications (the first, laissez-faire and the second, interventionist), and they 
suggest different approaches to the power of technology (the first, autonomous and the 
second, human directed). A determinist approach to technology removes human agency 
(and therefore responsibility) and locates it instead in the technology itself, while a 
social constructivist approach regards technology as fundamentally shaped by human 
defined expectations, perceptions and, significantly for this article, power (Bimber 
1990; Kraft and Vig 1988; MacKenzie and Wacjman 1999; Pinch and Bijker 1989; 
Winner 1985). The following pages explain how and why US policymakers have laid 
claim to a determinist approach while actually pursuing the policies dictated by a social 
constructivist approach. This is not simply an academic exercise in determining how the 
philosophy of technology fits into this empirical material. It is essential in order to 
deconstruct how these policymakers regard US power and Internet Freedom in the 
context of the Arab Spring events. 
 
Internet Freedom: A Digital Che Guevara? 
The public face of the Department of State‘s new media policy had for some 
time been Jared Cohen and Alec Ross—two young diplomats who had been influential 
in formulating policy around Internet technology. Ross, Senior Advisor for Innovation 
expressed some definite ideas about the relationship between the Internet (social 
networking media in particular), power and agency in international relations. In keeping 
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with a determinist approach, Ross regarded the technology itself as having agency, 
referring to the Internet as ‗the Che Guevara of the 21st Century‘. Furthering the 
revolutionary metaphor, Ross argued that ‗connection technology takes power away 
from the nation-state and … gives it to individuals‘ (Ross 2011).  
In this determinist view, the Internet is an autonomous actor that reassigns 
agency and power in international relations. During this period, the Department of State 
was promoting the message that these events were a natural and probably inevitable 
outcome of new democratising technology. The US (it was argued), was simply an 
observer of these events with real agency resting in Arabic ‗civilian power‘ through 
Internet Freedom (Clinton 2011a, 2011b; Crowley 2011). Prominent theorist Langdon 
Winner has argued that by imbuing technology with agency and purpose, we may deny 
having it ourselves, and therefore be released from the burden of accountability (Winner 
1985). 
Framing the role of Internet and mobile technology in the Arab Spring uprisings 
in a determinist approach to technology served to insulate (to some extent) the 
Department of State from accusations of actively promoting regime change. However, 
there were explicit contradictions to this view evident in the fact that the Department of 
State funded the development of technological tools to help individuals avoid 
government restrictions and surveillance in a number of these states. This suggests a 
belief that technology can be shaped and directed to achieve political goals—it is not 
autonomous as in Ross‘s ‗Che Guevera‘ analogy. Rather, it is a tool for social and 
political reform. This is an approach to technology that puts agency back in the hands of 
those with power to shape it—a social constructivist approach to technology. 
 
Internet Freedom and Political Reform 
An important element of the promotion of Internet Freedom has been the control of 
technological tools supplied to states where online human rights have been perceived as 
lacking. This refers first to the funding and provision of technology that helps activists 
and protesters to evade detection and circumvent government restrictions on Internet 
access. It also refers to US restrictions on sales of surveillance and tracking tools to 
these governments (Horwitz, Asokan and Tate 2011). In Clinton‘s first speech on 
Internet Freedom in 2010, she outlined the supply side of this policy:  
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We are also supporting the development of new tools that enable citizens 
to exercise their rights of free expression by circumventing politically 
motivated censorship … [w]e want to put these tools in the hands of 
people who will use them to advance democracy and human rights 
(Clinton 2010).  
There is an expectation here that ‗civilian power‘, if provided the right tools, will bring 
about political change. 
Again, the policy framework for this funding program allows us to observe the 
relationship between Internet Freedom as a human right and as an expression of state 
power. It is a relationship that produces both tension and accord. Ross clearly 
contradicts Clinton‘s view by arguing that the many tools funded and developed by the 
Department of State to circumvent political control over the Internet are not aimed at 
activists—rather they are developed with ‗everyday citizens‘ in mind in the drive to 
ensure their human rights are upheld (Ross 2012).
 
This may be a subtle distinction but it 
is an important one. In Ross‘s view, technological tools are developed and delivered to 
everyone as a means of facilitating their human right to Internet access. Whether that 
leads to political change is immaterial because the provision is a human rights issue. In 
Clinton‘s view, these tools are targeted at those political actors who might be expected 
to use them to bring about political change and this demonstrates belief in a strategic 
element of Internet technology. In a 2012 address, State senior official Michael Posner 
was clear that Internet Freedom was not to be linked to aspirations of regime change in 
US foreign policy. ‗We don‘t promote Internet freedom or connective technologies as a 
means of promoting ―regime change.‖ We promote the freedoms of expression, 
association and assembly online and offline because these universal freedoms are the 
birthright of every individual‘ (Posner 2012). One may take Ross and Posner at their 
word (and why not—Internet Freedom as discussed earlier has a legacy of civil/human 
rights in the US), but by funding technology that allows citizens to avoid the scrutiny of 
their governments and by prohibiting the sale to certain states of surveillance 
technologies used freely in the West, Internet Freedom comes to be perceived by others 
as an expression of US power.  
A more recent development helps to illustrate this point about how far Internet 
Freedom is extended in its conception as a US foreign policy implement. Iranian media 
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faced sanctions through a Bill passed in the US Senate in November 2012. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) was accused in the text of the Bill as having 
infringed upon the rights of individuals‘ human rights by ‗broadcasting forced 
confessions and show trials‘ (S.3254 2012: 801-2). IRIB had been dropped six weeks 
earlier from the Eutelsat owned satellite service after pressure from the European Union 
and France‘s broadcasting authority (BBC News 2012; Eutelsat Communications 2012). 
The irony of Iran‘s broadcasting services being restricted under the auspices of Internet 
Freedom links back to lessons from miliblogs. If soldiers writing from the frontlines of 
their miserable conditions could generate public support for the war effort, what effect 
might greater exposure to an Iranian perspective have on global civil society? Ross had 
spoken about the Iranian media ecosystem earlier in the context of the Department of 
State‘s effective use of Twitter. Tweeting in Farsi, he noted, had allowed the US to 
reach the Iranian people directly without the Iranian government ‗mucking around our 
messages‘ (Ross 2011). It seems the reverse is not to be, and in the interests of Internet 
Freedom, an Iranian voice will not be heard in the West. 
Finding contradictions in policies like Internet Freedom is not particularly 
difficult and nor (when isolated) is it particularly interesting. However, examining why 
there are contradictions in this case can highlight the tension between Internet Freedom 
as a human right and Internet Freedom as an expression of state power. Whether the 
funding, distribution and restriction of technological tools is directed toward activists as 
Clinton argues, or ‗everyday citizens‘ as Ross and Posner suggest, it is evident that 
despite a diffusion of agency to civil society, the power of the Department of State to 
direct Internet technology to promote a foreign policy agenda remains intact. Whether 
IRIB has been restricted for Western audiences as a means of objecting to human rights 
abuses or because it undermines the interests of the US (and the European Union), it 
allows us to observe the boundaries of Internet Freedom as a universal human right. 
Contrary to Ross‘s determinist arguments, technology can be purpose built and 
delivered in such a way as to bring about change. A budget of US$100 million for the 
development of supplied Internet Freedom technology between 2008 and 2012 makes it 
difficult to continue to argue that this is simply ‗bottom up‘ change—and not to some 
extent at least, also top down (Hanson 2012). 
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Conclusion 
The link between conceptions of civil and human rights and the foundations of the US 
policy of Internet Freedom is clear and uncontroversial. That there is also a power 
component to the policy is less discussed and more contentious. The evolving view that 
Internet Freedom was a civil and then a human right, forced the US DoD to confront the 
way it dealt with soldiers‘ communiques in the context of the information age. The shift 
from one-to-one personal communication (letters, phone calls and even email) to one-
to-many (blogs), meant that questions of agency, control and security needed to be re-
evaluated. The lesson from military blogging was not simply that social networking is 
an unstoppable force for individual empowerment, a force to which powerful actors 
would have to bend. Nor did it signal a fundamental shift to a more transparent era for 
the US military. Rather, the substantive lesson from military blogging was that 
individual agency could work to institutional advantage. If some negative effects were 
tolerated, the positive impact of allowing open communication between soldiers and the 
US domestic population was considerable. In fact, it was more powerful than 
conventional media in generating support for the war effort.  
This lesson was significant enough to be later extrapolated beyond the setting of 
the DoD to being influential in the formation of Internet Freedom as part of a key 
foreign policy under Clinton‘s term as Secretary of State. The US Department of State 
and the DoD have adapted to the information age in such a way as to globally harness 
individual agency (reconceptualised in policy terms as ‗civilian power‘) for the 
promotion of US power. Although this is by no means as stable or reliable as some 
more conventional mechanisms, it is an expression of power that meets with few 
challenges to its legitimacy.  
The combination of human rights and the projection of US power produces the 
same problems of legitimacy for Internet Freedom that the Iraq war has introduced for 
the ‗Responsibility to Protect‘ concept. Walking a line between the promotion of human 
rights and the correlating promotion of US interests and power is a difficult balance and 
one which unfortunately can serve to undermine an authentic human rights agenda. 
Certainly, Clinton has been criticised for the contradictions inherent in Internet Freedom 
which ascribes freedom of access and freedom of information—but not to those who 
would do harm to US interests. In fact, it could be argued that her policy represents a 
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sophisticated and realistic attempt at squaring the circle of competing demands of 
transparency and security faced by liberal democracies in the information age.  
The problem is that while she may find consensus on the need to balance civil 
liberties and security from all governments, the devil is undoubtedly in the nuance. 
Different perceptions of who is entitled to Internet Freedom and who is not, between 
what online activity threatens state interests and what does not, even between how to 
define state interests, means that ultimately Internet Freedom remains subjective and 
contextual. Power in the information age will to some extent be defined by which 
version of Internet Freedom prevails over the others. 
 
Notes 
1. This Bill was introduced to the 107th Congress as HR 5524. It was reintroduced as 
HR 48 in 2003. In addition there was a Senate version in the 107th Congress numbered 
S 3093, co-sponsored by Senator Ron Wyden and Senator Jon Kyl. 
2. Buzzell‘s original blog is no longer available online but a compilation of his blog 
postings and other writing has been published in a manuscript. See Buzzell (2006). For 
his current blog, see <cbftw.blogspot.co.uk/>. 
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